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In everyday conversation, much communication is achieved using indirect language. This is 
particularly true when we utter requests. The decision to use indirect language is influenced 
by a number of factors including deniability, politeness, and the degree of imposition on the 
receiver of a request. In this paper we report the results of an eye-tracking experiment 
examining the influence on reading of the degree of imposition of a request. We manipulate 
whether context describes a situation in which the level of imposition on the receiver of the 
request is high (which thus motivates the use of indirect language) with one in which the 
level of imposition is low (and thus does not motivate the use of indirect language). We 
compare the comprehension of statements that are phrased indirectly with the comprehension 
of statements that are phrased more directly. We find that statements phrased indirectly are 
read more quickly in contexts where the level of imposition on the receiver is high versus 
when the level of imposition is low. In contrast, we find the processing of statements phrased 
directly does not vary as a function of level of imposition. This indicates that readers use 
pragmatic knowledge to guide interpretation of indirect requests. Our data provide an insight 
into the interface between pragmatic and semantic processing. 
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Successful language comprehension involves the integration of linguistic input with a 
reader’s knowledge and experience of the world (e.g., Garrod & Sanford, 1994; Sanford & 
Emmott, 2012; Sanford & Garrod, 1981, 1998). Part of this knowledge involves the 
interpersonal social considerations that influence the manner in which people communicate 
with each other. In everyday social situations, much communication is achieved indirectly 
(Pinker, Nowak & Lee, 2008). For example, after giving a presentation you might ask a 
colleague "What did you think of my presentation?" If the colleague provides an answer such 
as "It's hard to give a good presentation." it would suggest they are communicating an 
indirect meaning (i.e., that they didn't think much of the presentation). The fact they did not 
provide a direct answer to the question (thus violating the Gricean maxim of relevance) 
triggers a search for a hidden or indirect meaning (Holtgraves, 1998). In addition to replies, 
requests can be framed indirectly too. For example, in the context of a speeding motorist 
being stopped by a traffic cop, the motorist uttering “Perhaps there is another way we can 
resolve this” is likely to be interpreted as the motorist offering a bribe (see Lee & Pinker, 
2010).  
 Indirect meaning is ubiquitous in social interaction but, remarkably, there has been very 
little research in the psychology of language processing into the factors involved in how such 
indirect language is understood. The lack of research on the topic is surprising given the wide 
use of indirect meaning in everyday communication. Indeed, the psycholinguistic research 
that has previously examined hidden or non-literal meaning has tended to do so from a very 
particular perspective in terms of conventionalized indirect requests, idioms, metaphors, and 
metonymy that are largely context independent. By contrast, the indirect statements that we 










will examine are entirely context dependent, and thus require the reader to be sensitive to 
contextual factors and rules governing socially expected behaviours. 
 According to Holtgraves (1998) replies are recognised as communicating indirect 
meaning when they involve a violation of Grice’s relevance maxim (Grice, 1975). In other 
words, when someone answers a question with an (apparently) irrelevant reply, this relevance 
violation acts as a signal that a hidden meaning is being communicated. The violation of 
another Gricean maxim (that of manner) seems to be at play in the context of other types of 
indirect language. The utterance “Perhaps there is another way we can resolve this” means 
little out of context, but can easily be interpreted as someone offering a bribe in the context of 
that person being in a position to offer a bribe to another. Despite the inherent ambiguity in 
language that is phrased indirectly, people often prefer to use language in this way rather than 
in a more direct and unambiguous manner. Indeed, returning to the traffic cop example, a 
possible more direct equivalent of “Perhaps there is another way we can resolve this” such as 
“I’ll give you £20 and you could let me go” sounds unnatural. Given the potential increase in 
ambiguity as language becomes more indirect, there must be an equivalent (or greater) 
benefit that is gained from using indirect over direct language.  
 One key factor that is central to Politeness Theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) proposes 
that interlocutors have a desire to maintain “face” (Goffman, 1967). Face or the “public self-
image” is maintained through the use of the listener and speaker engaging in “face-work” to 
manage any occurrence of a face-threatening act. According to Politeness Theory, one way in 
which face can be threatened is by the degree of imposition associated with a particular 
request made by a speaker; note we are using the word “imposition” in the sense in which it 
used in Brown and Levinson’s work, rather than in the more everyday sense. According to 










Brown and Levinson, imposition is closely related to the autonomy of the recipient of a 
request. One way a request with a high level of imposition can come about is when both 
speaker and recipient know that the recipient is likely to respond favourably to the request. 
This is face-threatening to the recipient as this high level of imposition results in a reduction 
of their autonomy. According to Politeness Theory, this reduction in autonomy (and threat to 
the recipient’s face) can be managed by the speaker framing the request indirectly.  
 A number of studies have investigated the circumstances under which readers are 
sensitive to the use of face-work and the role of indirect language in face management. Using 
off-line methods such as rating tasks (e.g., “How polite is this?”) and production tasks (e.g., 
“What would you say in this context?”), research has offered strong support that the degree 
of imposition on the receiver of a request influences the decision to frame the request 
indirectly (e.g., Brown & Gilman, 1989; Holtgraves & Yang, 1992; Leichty & Applegate, 
1991). As the level of perceived imposition rises, so too does the perceived politeness of the 
associated request (Brown & Gilman, 1989; Holtgraves & Yang, 1992). When imposition is 
high, participants favour the use of indirect language to frame the request. Given that 
language almost always occurs in a social context, it is perhaps surprising that the influence 
of politeness and face-management factors on how language is comprehended (and produced) 
has not received more research attention in the language processing literature. Indeed, 
Holtgraves (2005) and Brown (1990) highlight the research potential for both social and 
cognitive psychology in the development of a better understanding of the relationship 
between language usage and the interpersonal social world. The focus of the experiment 
below is on how the degree of imposition of a request influences the comprehension of 
statements that are phrased indirectly. 











Of the limited research into indirect language of the type we are interested in, previous 
studies have utilised off-line questionnaires (Lim & Bowers, 1991), rating tasks (Clark & 
Schunk, 1980; Holtgraves & Yang, 1990), or decision tasks (Holtgraves & Yang, 1992) to 
measure how statements that are phrased indirectly are understood. In the experiment below 
we address a gap in the literature through examining readers’ sensitivity to indirect 
statements by looking at how people process indirect and more direct statements (e.g., 
indirect: “Perhaps there is another way we can resolve this”, direct: “I’ll give you £20 and 
you could let me go”). We use eye-tracking during reading and manipulate how the degree of 
imposition of a request influences the processing of subsequent language that varies in its 
directness (see Example 1).  
 
Example 1 
Doug was speeding in his car and was stopped by a traffic cop. Traffic cops in this area were 
known to be dishonest/honest. Doug said “Perhaps there is another way we can resolve 
this.”/”Doug said “I’ll give you £20 and you could let me go.” The cop accepted the bribe 
and Doug avoided the penalty. Doug was on his way to visit his grandmother. 
 
When context describes the traffic cops in a particular area as being dishonest, this results in 
a high probability of success of the bribe, and thus a high level of imposition on the recipient; 
both parties know that the cop will likely accept the bribe. Conversely, when context 
describes the traffic cops in a particular area as being honest, this results in a low probability 
of success of the bribe, and thus a low level of imposition on the recipient; they are under no 










obligation to accept the bribe (and both parties know this). According to Politeness Theory, 
requests involving a high degree of imposition are more likely to involve indirect language. 
The utterance “Perhaps there is another way we can resolve this” should therefore be 
processed straightforwardly where a possible indirect meaning is supported by context. In 
contrast, the same utterance should cause processing difficulty when context does not offer 
up an obvious indirect meaning. A request that is made more directly (e.g., “I’ll give you £20 
and you could let me go”) should be relatively easy to process regardless of context; its 
meaning is direct and thus less influenced by pragmatics-level factors. Our question of 
interest is when such information is available to influence the processing of statements that 
are phrased indirectly. Do such cues influence processing of indirect language as soon as it is 
encountered, or is their influence delayed? Given that pragmatics-driven processing is needed 
to understand the meaning being communicated by statements phrased indirectly, but less so 
by statements phrased directly, we might expect a differential effect of context on the 
processing of indirect versus direct language. Alternatively, it may be the case that the 
meaning of indirectly phrased statements is represented in an underspecified manner (Sanford 
& Sturt, 2002), in which case we would expect processing of indirect language to proceed the 
same regardless of context.  
 
Pre-Test 
Prior to the eye-tracking experiment we conducted a pre-test to ensure that the statements 
involving indirect language did not have a conventionalized meaning and so required context 
to be correctly understood. Twenty-six participants were presented with the 28 indirect 
statements in and out of context. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale the 










extent to which the meaning of each statement phrased indirectly was similar to the more 
directly phrased counterpart. A score towards 7 meant that the meanings of the indirect and 
direct statements were seen as more similar, while a score towards 1 meant that their meaning 
were seen as less similar. A by-items analysis found that the statements involving indirect 
language were rated as having a more similar meaning as the direct counterpart when they 
were presented in context than when they were presented out of context (M = 5.91, S.E. = 
0.10 when the indirect statements were presented in context vs. M = 4.59, S.E. = 0.18 when 
the indirect statements were presented out of context, t(27) = 8.77, p < .001, d = 1.76). This 
indicates that context is necessary for the statements involving indirect and direct language to 
be seen as similar. This is important in order to ensure that any effects observed in the eye-
tracking study below could not be due to conventionalized knowledge of the indirect 




 Sixty native English speakers were recruited on an opportunistic basis. Participants had 
normal or corrected vision and no known reading impairment. Participants were compensated 
either monetarily or with course credits. 
 
Design and Materials 
The experiment included two independent variables each with two levels, Statement Phrasing 
(Indirect vs. Direct) and Degree of Imposition (High vs. Low). There were 28 vignettes that 










each appeared with four versions (see Table 1 for an example)1. These 112 vignettes were 
then allocated to participants using a repeated measures Latin squared design. Each list 
contained 28 experimental, 14 filler, and 2 practice items. Each list was seen by 15 
participants.   
The experimental vignettes all followed the same structure. Sentence one introduced 
the main character (speaker). Sentence two manipulated the Degree of Imposition (High vs. 
Low) of the speaker’s subsequent request on the recipient. This was the imposition region of 
analysis. Sentence three manipulated the statement phrasing (Indirect vs. Direct). The quoted 
statement in this region was the critical region of analysis. The fourth sentence indicated the 
acceptance of the request by the recipient. This was the post-critical region of analysis. The 
final sentence captured any wrap-up effects. Information in this sentence was not related to 
the request. The first, fourth, and final sentence were lexically identical across conditions. 
 
 
                                                
1 The full set of materials is available upon request from the corresponding author. 


















Indirect High Doug was speeding in his car and was stopped by a traffic 
cop. |Traffic cops in this area were known to be dishonest. 
IMPOSITION| Doug said |“Perhaps there is another way we 
can resolve this”. CRITICAL| The cop accepted the bribe and 
Doug avoided the penalty. POST-CRITICAL| Doug was on his 
way to visit his grandmother. 
Indirect Low Doug was speeding in his car and was stopped by a traffic 
cop. |Traffic cops in this area were known to be honest. 
IMPOSITION| Doug said |“Perhaps there is another way we 
can resolve this”. CRITICAL| The cop accepted the bribe and 
Doug avoided the penalty. POST-CRITICAL| Doug was on his 
way to visit his grandmother. 
Direct High Doug was speeding in his car and was stopped by a traffic 
cop. |Traffic cops in this area were known to be dishonest. 
IMPOSITION| Doug said |“I’ll give you £20 and you could let 
me go”. CRITICAL| The cop accepted the bribe and Doug 
avoided the penalty. POST-CRITICAL| Doug was on his way to 
visit his grandmother. 
Direct Low Doug was speeding in his car and was stopped by a traffic 
cop. |Traffic cops in this area were known to be honest. 
IMPOSITION| Doug said |“I’ll give you £20 and you could let 
me go”. CRITICAL| The cop accepted the bribe and Doug 
avoided the penalty. POST-CRITICAL| Doug was on his way to 
visit his grandmother. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed to read silently to themselves for the sole purpose of 
comprehension. They were instructed to read at their normal rate. They were informed that 
comprehension questions would follow some but not all of the vignettes. The participants’ 
eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink 1000 in the desktop mount configuration. 
Reading was binocular, however, only the right eye was sampled. A chin rest and forehead 










mount stabilized the head. The items were presented on a desktop monitor, in size 22 Arial 
font, and 60cm from the participant’s eye.  
The eyetracker was calibrated at the beginning of the session using 9 fixation points. 
This was repeated as necessary to ensure accuracy of fixation throughout the entirety of the 
experiment. Each trial began with a blank screen except for the presence of a gaze trigger, 
which was located towards the top left corner of the monitor. A fixation on this triggered the 
vignette to appear in full. The participant pressed a button on a controller to indicate they 
understood the vignette and were ready to move onto the next trial. Participants first 
completed two practice trials both followed by comprehension questions to ensure the 




Analysis of effects in the Imposition, Critical and Post-Critical regions was performed in R 
(R Development Core Team, 2015) using linear mixed models (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 
2008) on the First Pass, Regression Path and Total Time reading measures. Logit mixed 
models were used to investigate the binomial First Pass Regressions Out (FPRO), and 
Regressions In measures (following Jaeger, 2008). Statement Phrasing, Degree of Imposition, 
and the interaction between them were used as fixed factors in the analysis, with participants 
and items as crossed random factors. Maximal random effects structures were used where 
possible: random intercepts for participants and items, as well as by-participant and by-item 
random slopes on all factors (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). For the binomial FPRO 
measure on the Critical and Post-Critical regions, and for the Regressions In measure on the 










Imposition region, separate by participants and by items logit mixed models were constructed 
as the model that included both participant and item random effects failed to converge. The 
FPRO models used only Statement Phrasing as a random slope, while the Regressions In 
models used Statement Phrasing and Degree of Imposition additively as a random slope.  
 The analyses were carried out using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015) to fit the linear mixed models for the reading time measures in R (R 
Development Core Team, 2015). Pairwise comparisons conducted with the lsmeans package 
(Lenth & Hervé, 2015) were used to investigate significant interactions for these reading time 
measures. The glmer function in the lme4 package with Laplace approximation was used for 
the FPRO and Regressions In measures. Below we report regression coefficients (b), standard 
errors, and t-values (for duration measures) or z-values (for the binomial measure). Restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation was used for the reporting of linear mixed model parameters, 
and maximum likelihood estimation for the reporting of logit mixed model parameters. 
Deviation coding was used for each of the two experimental factors (Barr et al., 2013). 
Absolute values of the t-value and z-value greater than or equal to 1.96 indicate an effect that 
is significant at approximately the .05 alpha level. For pairwise comparisons we report the t-
values and p-values. Degrees of freedom are approximated using the Kenward-Roger 
method. The means for each eye movement measure (calculated over participants) for the 
Imposition region are displayed in Table 2, and for the Critical and Post-Critical regions in 
Table 3. The results of the linear mixed models are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6 
 


























    
Indirect/High 1,887 (70) 2,155 (73) 22 (3) 2,202 (75) 
Indirect/Low 2,071 (62) 2,429 (80) 28 (3) 2,680 (90) 
Direct/High 1,885 (63) 2,196 (89) 20 (2) 2,285 (92) 
Direct/Low 1,977 (71) 2,390 (95) 29 (3) 2,565 (94) 

























Critical Region      
Indirect/High 1,025 (38) 1,518 (55) 29 (3) 1,474 (51) 
Indirect/Low 1,056 (46) 1,607 (60) 31 (3) 1,627 (59) 
Direct/High 1,138 (51) 1,616 (65) 27 (3) 1,594 (57) 
Direct/Low 1,086 (46) 1,586 (59) 31 (3) 1,579 (64) 
Post-Critical 
Region 
    
Indirect/High 1,477 (51) 1,651 (53) 9 (2) 1,692 (61) 
Indirect/Low 1,505 (55) 1,824 (64) 12 (2) 1,833 (63) 
Direct/High 1,427 (54) 1,562 (60) 5 (2) 1,621 (57) 
Direct/Low 1,408 (48) 1,683 (56) 11 (2) 1,648 (55) 
 










Table 4: Results of the linear mixed models for the Imposition Region and measures of 
interest. Significant effects are highlighted in bold. 
  Duration measures Binomial measure 
  First Pass Regression Path Total Time Regressions In – by 
participants 
Regressions In – by 
items 
  b SE t b SE t b SE t b SE z b SE z 
Imposition  
Region 
              
 Intercept 1951 98 19.82 2291 116 19.79 2435 120 20.26 -1.297 0.138 -9.937 -1.155 0.088 -13.148 
 Statement 
Phrasing 
-39 45 -0.87 6 55 0.12 -19 52 -0.37 -0.069 0.133 -0.519 -0.046 0.120 -0.383 
 Degree of 
Imposition 
-132 58 -2.277 -230 71 -3.22 -382 80 -4.75 -0.493 0.133 -3.704 -0.447 0.178 -2.509 
 Interaction 83 83 1.00 77 99 0.80 204 96 2.13 -0.158 0.243 -0.649 -0.108 0.237 -0.454 
 
 
Table 5: Results of the linear mixed models for the Critical Region and measures of interest. 
Significant effects are highlighted in bold. 
  Duration measures Binomial measure 
  First Pass Regression Path Total Time First Pass 
Regressions Out – 
by participants 
First Pass 
Regressions Out – 
by items 
  b SE t b SE t b SE t b SE z b SE z 
Critical Region               
 Intercept 1076 59 18.30 1583 72 22.10 1569 76 20.58 -0.94 0.10 -9.20 -089 0.09 -9.56 
 Statement 
Phrasing 
71 65 1.01 31 103 0.30 36 86 0.42 -0.12 0.12 -1.00 -0.05 0.13 -0.38 
 Degree of 
Imposition 
11 37 0.30 -34 49 -0.68 -69 40 -1.73 -0.13 0.11 -1.15 -0.13 0.11 -1.15 
 Interaction 82 78 1.06 131 82 1.60 169 80 2.10 -0.11 0.22 -0.47 -0.08 0.22 -0.36 











Table 6: Results of the linear mixed models for the Post-Critical Region and measures of 
interest. Significant effects are highlighted in bold. 
  Duration measures Binomial measure 
  First Pass Regression Path Total Time First Pass 
Regressions Out – 
by participants 
First Pass 
Regressions Out – 
by items 
  b SE t b SE t b SE t b SE z b SE z 
Post-Critical Region               
 Intercept 1451 67 21.54 1676 75 22.25 1695 74 22.98 -2.72 0.18 -15.01 -2.39 0.13 -18.36 
 Statement 
Phrasing 
-65 34 -1.92 -105 51 -2.06 -120 42 -2.87 -0.37 0.25 -1.46 -0.40 0.20 -1.94 
 Degree of 
Imposition 
4 28 0.15 -137 49 -2.79 -76 42 -1.83 -0.66 0.19 -3.54 -0.60 0.18 -3.44 
 Interaction 36 56 0.64 45 93 0.48 99 65 1.51 -0.58 0.38 -1.54 -0.52 0.35 -1.49 
 
Imposition Region 
On First Pass and Regression Path we found an effect of Degree of Imposition such that 
sentences with a high degree of imposition were read more quickly than sentences with a low 
degree of imposition. As these sentences differ lexically, there should be caution in over-
interpreting what this might mean. No other effects were significant on these measures. On 
the measure of Total Time, we found an effect of Degree of Imposition and an interaction 
between Statement Phrasing and Degree of Imposition. Total reading times indicated that the 
difference between the High versus the Low Degree of Imposition conditions was greater in 
the context of Indirect statements than in the context of Direct statements (a difference of 478 
ms. vs. 280 ms., t (28.5) = 4.745, p < .001 vs. t (23) = 3.310, p = .003). On the measures of 
Regressions In, we found an effect of Degree of Imposition such that there were more 










regressions back to this region in the Low versus the High Degree of Imposition conditions 
(29% vs. 21%). 
 
Critical Region 
On First Pass, Regression Path and First Pass Regressions Out measures we found no effect 
of Statement Phrasing, Degree of Imposition and no interaction between these two factors. 
On the measure of Total Time, we found a significant interaction between Statement 
Phrasing and Degree of Imposition. Total reading times indicated that Direct statements were 
read at the same speed in the High versus the Low Degree of Imposition conditions (1,594 vs. 
1,579 ms., t (27.31) = 0.247, p = 0.806), while Indirect statements were read more quickly in 
High versus the Low Imposition condition (1,474 vs. 1,627 ms., t (20.94) = 3.026, p = 0.006).  
 
Post-Critical Region 
On First Pass reading times we found no effect of Statement Phrasing, Degree of Imposition 
and no interaction between these two factors. On Regression Path and Total Time measures 
we found a main effect of Statement Phrasing such that reading times to the post-critical 
region following Direct statements were faster than reading times following Indirect 
statements (1,623 ms. vs. 1,738 ms. for Regression Path, 1,635 ms. vs. 1,763 ms. for Total 
Time). On Regression Path times we found a main effect of Degree of Imposition such that 
reading times to the post-critical region following the High Degree of Imposition conditions 
were faster than reading times following Low Degree of Imposition conditions (1,607 ms. vs. 
1,754 ms.). Additionally, there were more First Pass Regressions Out of the post-critical 










region in the Low Degree of Imposition conditions versus the High Degree of Imposition 
conditions (12% vs. 7%).  
 
Discussion 
In an eye-tracking experiment we examined how readers process requests that were phrased 
indirectly and directly in contexts that did or did not motivate the use of indirect language 
(i.e., contexts that involved requests that placed a high versus a low level of imposition on the 
request recipient). High imposition contexts are face-threatening as they involve a reduction 
in the autonomy of the request recipient. This is because both parties know that the recipient 
is likely to respond favourably to the request. For low imposition contexts, there is no such 
reduction in autonomy (and thus no threat to the recipient’s face). We found that statements 
involving indirect language were read more quickly when presented in contexts in which the 
level of imposition on the request recipient was high than when it was low. According to 
Politeness Theory, a high level of imposition motivates the use of indirect language. This 
effect emerged on the measure of total reading time for the Critical Region. As this measure 
reflects the total time involved in reading the particular region of text, it captures both initial 
reading and subsequent re-reading. The lack of an effect on measures that tapped into initial 
reading suggests that it takes some time for the influence of the degree of imposition of a 
request to be exerted on how indirect language is processed. For statements involving direct 
language, the picture is somewhat different. We found no effect of the degree of imposition 
of a request on any measure of reading statements involving direct language. These 
statements were read at the same speed regardless of the degree of imposition of the 
associated request. We propose that this is because the meaning communicated in the 










statements that were phrased directly is relatively easy to extract without recourse to the 
context in which those statements occur. Therefore, any effects of the degree of imposition of 
the request are likely to be relatively weak (if they exist at all).  
 On the Post-Critical Region of text that followed the statements, we found that 
reading times were elevated when this region followed indirect language relative to when it 
followed direct language. This effect emerged on both Regression Path and Total Time 
measures of reading. We propose that the slowdown following the comprehension of indirect 
language reflects the inferential activity involved in readers establishing the meaning that is 
communicated indirectly. In contrast, statements involving direct language convey their 
meaning directly so less subsequent inferencing is required in order for them to be 
understood. We also found a relative slowdown in reading on the Post-Critical Region of text 
following statements in the context of requests that had a low level of imposition (and thus a 
low likelihood of success). This penalty emerged on the regression path measure for both 
direct and indirect language and likely reflects a simple effect of plausibility. It is a little odd 
for someone to utter a request, and for that request to be accepted by the recipient, if prior 
context suggests that the request is not likely to result in the desired outcome (cf. Albrecht & 
O’Brien, 1993). We also found an increase in First Pass Regressions Out on the Post-Critical 
Region of text in the low level of imposition condition. Again, this disruption likely reflects 
readers’ sensitivity to plausibility, with the reading of implausible events causing more 
disruption to eye movements than the reading of plausible events. This plausibility effect also 
explains why there were more regressions back to the sentence that described the degree of 
imposition in the low degree of imposition conditions. Interestingly, we also found an 
interaction in terms of total reading times for the Imposition Region: the difference between 










the low and high degree of imposition conditions was greater in the context of indirect versus 
direct statements. This is consistent with the view that indirect language is motivated by the 
degree of imposition of a request and that readers are sensitive to this during comprehension.   
 The experiment we report above is one of the few to look at how the comprehension 
of requests that are phrased indirectly operates in light of face-saving considerations during a 
naturalistic reading task (cf. Bašnáková, Weber, Petersson, van Berkum, & Hagoort, 2014, 
for an fMRI study on how indirect replies are comprehended). As we described in our 
introduction, there is remarkably little psycholinguistic work examining the time course of 
the comprehension of non-conventionalized indirect requests. This is surprising given the 
importance of the role played by factors related to politeness in how people choose to frame 
their requests. We know from research on indirect replies that people are sensitive to 
violations of Grice’s maxim of relevance (e.g., Holtgraves, 1998). In our experiment, we find 
evidence that readers are sensitive to the degree of imposition of a request motivating the use 
of indirect over direct language. We propose that this reflects a sensitivity to the Gricean 
maxim of manner. Out of context, indirect requests are unclear. We suspect the lack of an 
obvious meaning associated with an indirect request triggers readers to identify a likely 
meaning using the contextual information they have available to them. Our findings suggest 
that the interpersonal social factors that underlie the way in which requests are framed in 
indirect versus direct language inform how such utterances are processed during reading. We 
suspect that understanding how considerations related to interpersonal politeness influence 
language usage has a large amount of research potential, and hope that further work will 
reveal more of the interplay between these two areas.  
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